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1 INTRODUCTION
Assimilation of immigrant groups, that is cultural integration and the emergence of common
values and norms, was seen as a natural process until the 1960’s. However, by that time contra-
dictory evidence surfaced. It was shown that assimilation failed along religious lines (Herberg
(1983), Mayer (1979)) as well as ethnic dimensions (Glazer and Moynihan (1963)). This resulted
in the emergence of multiculturalism. Under this doctrine the norms and values of immigrants
were taken as given, their culture accepted without attempts of change (Glazer (1998)). This
attitude has also influenced immigration policies. Recently, however, the problems associated
with multiculturalism, such as fragmentation, lack of civic communality or the modalities and
role of affirmative action policies have come to the forefront of the immigration debate. This
has resulted in a reemergence of assimilationist policies in several countries. For example, the
US, France and Germany have all adopted policies that aim at assimilating immigrants more
than before (Brubaker (2001)). The most prominent example might be that of the Netherlands,
though. Multiculturalism was adopted in the 1980s following immigration in the 1950s and
1960s Schalk-Soekar et al. (2004) but had been completely replaced by an assimilationist atti-
tude by 2011.1 The policies aimed at assimilating immigrants require a detailed understanding
of the assimilation process and in particular of why assimilation often fails along religious and
ethnic lines.
This paper proposes a novel explanation for this persistence of cultural traits amongst im-
migrant communities in a setting where they are exposed to assimilation pressures – the pres-
ence of an institution.2 This institution is a social entrepreneur whose earnings depend both on
the identity of the group members as well as their income and can be thought of as a church,
foreign-language media, ethnic business association or even a foreign government. For exam-
ple, religious leaders benefit from donations and also have an interest in the values and norms
of their followers; foreign language media such as newspapers want immigrants to subscribe
to their paper. This depends on the immigrant’s knowledge of their original language and their
valuation for media in this language.
We argue that such institutions are instrumental in preserving the boundaries of an im-
migrant community. To make our point we study a model of assimilation and consider the
assimilation process of a community with and without an institution. In a next step, we allow
the institution to foster or prevent assimilation depending on its payoff structure and resulting
1See an article titled The Netherlands to Abandon Multiculturalism.
2Other complementary explanations are parent’s preferences for cultural traits (Bisin and Verdier (2000)), ethnic
and cultural distance to the host country (Alba and Nee (1997); Bisin et al. (2008)) or previous educational back-
ground (Borjas (1985)). It can also depend on the discrimination immigrants face, which might be affected by where
exactly the new arrivals locate (Alba and Nee (1997)).
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incentives.
In our model, immigrants decide how much to invest in host country specific skills, such
as language skills and understanding of and adherence to customs and norms. Investment in
these skills increases earnings,3 but it is costly. In particular, it is more costly for immigrants
who come from a more culturally different background that has shaped their identity.4 Our
notion of identity follows that of Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010) in that it is a sense of self
that influences behavior. If an individual has been raised in an environment where norms and
values are very different, then it is harder to adjust to the way of life in the host country as
this is in violation to one’s identity. However, different from Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010),
our notion of identity is continuous and dynamic, that is, it changes with skill investment.
Skill acquisition impacts identity as it affects the exposure to the host country, for example
through the education system, to different language media and to different norms and values.
An immigrant’s assimilation process is thus two-pronged: he invests in skills, which dilutes
his identity, that is, he identifies less with the norms and values of his original background and
more with those of the host country. A change in identity, in turn, affects skills investment.
Thus, our model explicitly captures the interaction of identity formation with the assimilation
process and is to the best of our knowledge the first model to do so.
We show that without the presence of an institution, immigrants assimilate fully in the long
run. They initially only invest to a very limited extent in skills. However, as this investment
leads to a small adjustment of the identity, immigrants have an incentive to invest slightly
more in skills, leading to further adjustment in identity and so on. This process continues
until full assimilation is reached. In contrast, full assimilation will never occur in the presence
of an institution that upholds the original values and norms and that has influence on the
community. Instead, each group member’s identity ends up as a strictly convex combination
of the norms of the host society and those propagated by the institution, and it permanently
remains there. The extent of assimilation depends on the strength of influence of the institution
3An estimate of how important mastering the language of the host country is, is given by McManus (1990). He
finds that after adjusting for education and other socioeconomic characteristics, learning English leads to a 17%
wage increase for Hispanics in the US. This amounts to a $96,000 (in 1993 dollars) increase in lifetime income for a
Hispanic immigrant who learns English. Further estimates of the impact on language skills on wages are given in
McManus et al. (1983), Grenier (1984), McManus (1985), Chiswick (1991), Chiswick and Miller (1992), Aleksynska
and Algan (2010) and Borjas (2013). Kossoudji (1988) states that "language assimilation, [as it] is translated into
a job-usable skill.” Meng and Gregory (2005) find that there is a wage premium for immigrants who married
natives, even after controlling for language proficiency, an indicator of the importance of understanding norms.
Their finding, based on Australian data, is in contrast to Kantarevic (2004). He shows for the US that there is no
wage premium for marrying a native. The importance of understanding norms is also supported by the finding
that immigrants who either immigrated as children or have lived in the host country for a significant amount of
time have a higher wage than immigrants who only recently arrived, see Borjas and Freeman (1992), Nielsen et al.
(2004).
4Some evidence of this provided in Glazer and Moynihan (1963, p.10).
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on the immigrant group as well as how the immigrant group is connected.
Next, we allow the institution to choose the norms and values and the identity that it
projects towards the community. As different institutions such as churches and ethnic business
associations are fundamentally different in their goals, we distinguish between two types of
institutions: an altruistic institution that cares about the identity per se as well as the economic
success of the group and an extractive institution that is only interested in preserving a distinct
identity in order to increase its monetary payoff from the group. Both types of institutions pre-
fer their group members to be as culturally distinct and as wealthy as possible. Wealthier group
member contribute more to the community and its institutions.5 Further, expenditures, such as
subscriptions or donations are increasing in identity.6 Protestants, for example, are more gener-
ous than Catholics, which is said to be largely because of stronger social norms and their higher
level of church attendance (Berger (2006), Zaleski and Zech (1992)). Similarly, the printers of
national language newspapers can only be profitable if someone buys their newspaper, which
in turn depends on how much the readership identifies as, for example, German as opposed
to American Breton (1964). The institution faces a trade off between cultural distinction and
financial wealth as group members with a higher income identify less with the group, whereas
poorer group members identify more with the group.
We analyze when an institution will be extremist, that is, when it chooses norms that are
maximally distinct from the those of the host society and under which circumstances partial
or complete assimilation occurs. We find that both types of institutions may have incentives
to be extremist. Further, altruistic institutions might allow full integration, whereas extractive
institutions never do. Both institutions may also choose some cultural distinction from the host
society without being extreme, resulting in an intermediate, if still incomplete, level of assimi-
lation. For this intermediate outcome we consider the effect of an increase in discrimination on
the optimal cultural distinction the institution chooses to project. Somewhat surprisingly we
find that both types of institution choose more cultural distinction as discrimination decreases.
This implies that an increase in discrimination will lead to higher assimilation. The intuition
behind this effect is that higher discrimination will reduce the economic wealth available for
the community, creating an incentive for the institution to counter it by fostering more assimi-
lation. Last, the payoffs of the institutions depend on the community structure. Structures that
are more densely connected are preferred by extractive institutions whereas altruistic institu-
tions gain a higher payoff from less cohesive groups.
5See Schervish (1993), Bekkers and Wiepking (2011) and Wiepking and Bekkers (2012) for charitable giving.
6Akerlof and Kranton (2000) mention that individuals are more willing to give to their alma mater than to other
colleges, which is an indicator for identity influencing charitable giving. If only altruism mattered, individuals
should contribute the charity that gives the greatest marginal benefit. But this clearly does not happen.
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Our findings can help understand four distinct stylized facts about the integration of immi-
grants: (1) Religious leaders of immigrants are often recruited from the home country, instead
of the host country.7 Our model argues that this approach may be designed to ensure that the
representatives uphold the norms and values of the home country more strongly. It thus pro-
vides a means to limit assimilation and for immigrants to hold on to their values and norms to
a greater extent than they would if the leader was educated in the host country and had been
influenced more by these norms and values. (2) Bisin et al. (2008), Constant et al. (2006) and
Haug (2008) argue that Muslim immigrants are different from other immigrants in their assim-
ilation experience. One source of difference might be that Imams face different incentives than
other religious leaders. Ceylan (2010, p. 61) argues that a majority of Imams come to Germany
with financial motives, that is, they see a position in a German congregation as way to earn a
better living. In this case it is more plausible to think of the religious leader as an extractive
institution, which leads to differences in the norms and values that are set and consequently
to different assimilation outcomes. (3) Carvalho and Koyama (2011) show that Rabbis in high-
wage environments will foster assimilation, but in low-wage environments will prevent it. We
characterize circumstances in which our model can help understand differences in assimilation
outcomes, depending on the environment. An altruistic leader, whose community consists of
high ability members that face little discrimination will be inclined to choose assimilation and
vice versa. (4) The investment of immigrants in host country language skills is surprisingly
low given the high wage premium attached to it McManus (1990); Borjas (2013). We assume
that costs of investment in language skills depend on identity, making the investment more
costly than in a traditional model. Additionally, identity is affected by language skills through
increased exposure to the host country, implying that language acquisition does not only result
in higher wages, but also in a loss of identity.8 Our model suggests that a community institu-
tion may therefore have an incentive to limit language acquisition to increase its payoffs.
Related Literature Our paper contributes to the vibrant literature on the transmission of cul-
tural traits. The majority of this work argues that cultural traits of children are shaped by their
parents, based on the seminal paper by Bisin and Verdier (2000). Parents have a paternalistic
preferences for their children to have the same cultural trait. In case of discrete cultural traits
this can explain why cultural integration remains incomplete. Our work assumes cultural traits
to be continuous and builds upon the classical approach of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1973).
7See Ceylan (2010), Geaves (2008) as well as the Polish Catholic Mission in England and Wales.
8That better host country language skills increase exposure to host country media has been documented in
Subervi-Velez (1986). This implies an increased exposure to norms and values of the host country, which can have
an effect on an individual’s identity.
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Other papers based on this approach include Bisin and Verdier (2001), Vaughan (2013), Büchel
et al. (2011) and Panebianco (2014). One key feature of all these papers is that with continuous
cultural traits there is full assimilation in the long run unless there are persistent ties to the
home country or subgroups are closed. Full assimilation occurs even if parents have prefer-
ences for the persistence of the cultural trait. We suggest that taking institutions into account
might help understand why assimilation often remains incomplete and we see our approach
as complementary to the emphasis on parents’ preferences as a determinant of the persistence
of cultural traits.9 Our model can help understand differences in the assimilation processes of
different immigrant groups Bisin and Verdier (2010). In particular, it is argued that there is a
difference between European and non-European immigrants in the US, with European immi-
grants coming from Europe before 1930 being perfectly assimilated today Alba and Nee (1997).
One possible difference between these groups might be the presence of a fixed institution.10
The importance of such an institution has also been documented in Carvalho and Koyama
(2011). The key difference of ours to their work is that our model allows for different type of in-
stitutions, where they only look at religious institutions. Additionally, we take group structures
into account. Empirically, Munshi and Wilson (2008) have also emphasized the importance of
institutions.
Our model is also related to the more recent work on opinion dynamics, and in particular
to Acemoglu et al. (2013). The main difference of our model is that in our setting the pattern of
interactions changes with identities. In addition, we allow leaders to be strategic in their choice
of identity.11
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses in depths our no-
tion of institutions and develops a selection of examples highlighting their importance. We
then present the model in Section 3 and proceed to solve it in Section 4. We first solve a bench-
mark case, without the presence of an institution (Section 4.1). Section 4.2 introduces a rigid
institution. In a next step, we allow this institution to be strategic (Section 5). Section 6 con-
cludes.
9Note that in one of examples that Bisin and Verdier (2000) provide there is indeed such an institution present.
In the case of the Orthodox Jews, rabbis have an incentive to preserve the culture and norms of their community. In
the other example, which discusses the transmission of cultural values among French aristocrats, it is the existence
of the Bottin Mondain, a book which contains the names of the relevant families and specifies clear rules for who
can be included in this listing, that serves as a means to prevent integration. Although a book differs from the
institutions we have in mind, it seems that the book acts an essential factor in preventing integration.
10Alternatively, one can think of parents of different communities having varied preferences regarding their chil-
dren’s cultural traits.
11Other work on opinion dynamics includes Acemoglu et al. (2010), Golub and Jackson (2010), DeMarzo et al.
(2003), Büchel et al. (2012), Lorenz (2005) and Lorenz (2006).
6
2 INSTITUTIONS AND THE ASSIMILATION PROCESS
We argue that the presence of an institution that is not susceptible to the influences of the host
country is crucial for the preservation of separate identities of an immigrant group or minority.
This is a novel idea in economics and it has received only limited attention elsewhere in the
social sciences. We therefore discuss in some detail the notion that these institutions, or lead-
ers, as they are also referred to in the sociology literature, have an impact on the assimilation
outcomes of immigrant groups and minorities. In what follows we use the terms institutions
and leaders interchangeably.
Examples of Institutions in Communities Imams and the Turkish Government in Germany
can be seen as leaders. The majority of Turkish Imams are employed by the DITIB, an insti-
tution of the Turkish government (Yasar (2012)). The DITIB and thus the Turkish government
select the imams and choose Imams that fit their ideological position. However, they do not
only choose Imams, they also influence what is preached every Friday by sending them the
sermon that is to be held (Ceylan (2010)). Through the Friday prayers the imams can influ-
ence their community, which also has an impact on the assimilation of Turkish immigrants.
Ceylan (2010) argues that Turkish Imams are crucial for the assimilation of Turkish communi-
ties in Germany. He states that imams influence the religious orientation of muslim children
and youths and thus have a large impact on the future of Islam in Germany as they influence
whether young Muslims follow a liberal, conservative or extremist Islam. Each form of Islam
comes with different norms and values which impact the assimilation of immigrants. He goes
as far as to say that the political and religious orientation and the attitude of imams towards the
German government decide whether Muslims will be integrated in the German society (Ceylan
(2010, p. 17)).
A second example is that of family clans in San Francisco’s Chinatown, a tightly knit com-
munity (Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993)). The family clans in the form of the Chinese Six
Companies, a business associations formed by these clans, ruled the immigrant community.
They regulated the business, but also the social life of the community, guaranteeing its nor-
mative order. Moreover, they regulated access to resources and gave privileges to some clans.
This regulation took place through restrictions on most members’ scope of action and access
to the outside world. They were willing to exclude those who violated normative consensus
by adopting a “progressive” stance. It is emphasized in Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) how
important the preservation of norms is. This can be seen best from the following quote.
“And not only the Moon Family Association, all the family associations, the Six
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Companies, any young person who wants to make some changes, they call him a
communist right away. He’s redcapped right away. They use all kinds of tricks
to run him out. You see, in old Chinatown, they didn’t respect a scholarly person
or an intelligent person . . . They hold on to everything the way it was in China, in
Kwangtung. Even though we’re in a different society, a different era. [Nee and Nee
1973, p. 190]”
Based on these two examples, we can draw several conclusions about the conditions under
which these institutions emerge, about the way they profit from the community, and about how
the leaders preserve community boundaries.
Emergence of Institutions A natural question to arise is why some communities have leaders
and others do not. What seems crucial is a sufficiently large community as well as sufficient
wealth. This is probably best documented for the Polish Catholic Mission. Since the earliest
immigration of Poles to the UK around 1900, there was always demand for a Polish church.
However, the creation of churches was prevented by the financial situation of the first emi-
grants and their dispersion. The situation changed only once sufficient funds were available
and then the church arose.12 Further, in the examples discussed here, there is a sufficiently large
group to follow these leaders. San Francisco’s Chinatown is one of the largest in the US. Fur-
ther, there are more than 3 million individuals who are Turkish or of Turkish descent living in
Germany.13 Other cases where leaders have emerged are Cubans in Miami. Portes and Sensen-
brenner (1993) argue that the Spanish-language media act as a leader to Cuban immigrants and
that there are millions of cubans in Miami.
In all examples given, leaders benefit from their communities and in order to extract suffi-
cient benefits, the communities have to be substantial in size. Even if the goal is not to maximize
payoffs, as one can well imagine for religious leaders such as Polish priests and imams, they
still require a minimum income to survive. Having only few followers will not guarantee this.
Thus, the presence of an institution or leader seems inevitable once a tight immigrant com-
munity has emerged. The formation of an immigrant community seems inevitable, though.
Networks among immigrant groups emerge due to the adversity faced in the new host country
and these networks are beneficial as they help find jobs or lead to access to credit. See Portes
and Sensenbrenner (1993) for several examples that document this. There is also a strong persis-
tence in immigrants flocking together. Immigrants not only live in enclaves upon first entering
the country, they also continue to do so afterwards. Moreover, their within-country migra-
12See the homepage of the Polish Catholic Mission http://www.pcmew.org/.
13See a report of the German statistics office from 2012.
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tion decisions are much less sensitive to regional wage differentials than those of natives Bartel
(1989).14
Institutions Profit from Community The leaders described in the examples profit from their
role in the community. The family clans in Chinatown regulate business, access to resources,
and give privileges to some clans. This clearly implies that the clans that were members in the
business association profited enormously from their position in the community. The Spanish-
language media of the Cuban community earns profits that are increasing in the number of
consumers. The payoffs to the Turkish government are probably not in monetary terms. They
do, however, have a strong influence on their communities, which benefits them. Last, religious
leader want to spread their norms and values and therefore gain from a community that fol-
lows their teachings. At the same time, they also get monetary benefits. That religious leaders
might care about money has been argued by Carvalho and Koyama (2011) for Rabbis, Ceylan
(2010, p. 61) for imams and the Polish Catholic Mission emphasizes the necessity of funds.
Institutions Preserve Identity and Communities The importance of institutions in maintain-
ing boundaries around immigrant groups is first documented by Breton (1964). He finds that
religious institutions have the greatest effect in preserving the community, followed by group
specific publications, such as newspapers or periodicals. The existence of welfare institutions
has the least effect on group identity, which seems rather striking. Individuals seem to be kept
within their group, not because of monetary benefits, but rather due to their identity. That iden-
tity and adherence to the norms and values propagated by the leaders are enforced can be seen
from all the examples we document. The Chinese Business Association excludes individuals
who do not follow the norms and values they have established. The Spanish-language media
imposes censorship and fosters a climate of intolerance in order to retain community bound-
aries (Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993)). Another example that emphasizes the importance of
the community’s identification with the leader is that of the Korean community in New York.
The Korean government, represented by its consulate general, plays a very prominent role in
the development of the ethnic community and de factor takes on the role of the leader.15
“Partly because Korean immigrants have a strong sense of nationalism and there-
fore identify with the home government, the Korean Consulate General in New
York City . . . has determined the basic tone of community-wide politics (Kim 1981,
14That enclaves and immigrant networks can be detrimental to education outcomes and wages is also docu-
mented in Munshi (2003); Hoff and Sen (2005).
15This example is described in Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993).
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p. 227).”
Thus, the Korean government only has influence as Koreans tend to have a strong sense of
nationalism. Religious leaders, that is Rabbis, Catholic Priests and Imams preach norms and
values according to the norms and values established by their respective religions. What these
examples are silent on are the types of norms that are transmitted by the leaders.
To be more precise we consider a specific well-studied example, namely the impact of be-
ing part of a Muslim community on the attitude to female labour force participation. Generally,
those who identify with being Muslim, have a more traditional attitude towards female labor
force participation, which in turn affects actual female labor force participation. Fortin (2005)
shows that perceptions of women as homemakers are closely associated with women’s labor
market outcomes. Views that see men as the main breadwinners and women as homemak-
ers are strongly influenced by religious ideology Algan and Cahuc (2006); Guiso et al. (2003);
Vella (1994); Thornton et al. (1983). Imams, in particular, seem to uphold the view of women
being first and foremost homemakers. An Algerian Imam, Abdelkader Bouziane, argued that
women should not be allowed to share a workplace with men because they might be tempted
into adultery. Imams in Oslo emphasize that Islam does not forbid women to work in the pub-
lic sphere, but that if women were to take outside jobs it should be in education or medical
care. Generally, there is a notion that women can work, if there is a financial need or if they
want to work. Men, however, are required to work.16 Another indicator that shows that Imams
hold on to a traditional view of gender roles can be seen from their background. In the UK, a
majority of Imams come from Pakistan, in Germany most Imams grew up in Turkey. In Arab
countries on average 82% of individuals agree with the statement that a man has more right to
a job than a woman compared to 63% for non-Arab countries Rizzo et al. (2007). It seems there-
fore plausible that the imams coming from such a background on average will support this
statement and that they project their views on their community. Another indicator of Imams’
views is the attitude towards burqas. A woman wearing a burqa has a difficult time integrating
in the labor market. The riots that accompanied the ban on burqas in France and the heated
discussions around this topic show that a strict Muslim identity is often at odds with the norms
and customs proclaimed by the West, thereby limiting the potential earnings of immigrants.17
In sum, there seems to be a demand of immigrants to bond with other immigrants. They
form a community, which is an attractive target for social entrepreneurs, with larger immigrant
16The role of men and women and how this conforms to the expectations of religious leaders is outlined in Predelli
(2004).
17Examples of clashes between the cultures can be found on http://www.pluralism.org/. An example that wear-
ing a burqa leads to reduced employment opportunities is given in an article by The Guardian.
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groups being more valuable. These social entrepreneurs have an interest in preserving the
group boundaries, in particular through the enforcement of norms and values, which leads to
incomplete assimilation. This result arises without an explicit preference of group members for
preserving their own culture and would only be strengthened by such considerations.
Based on these observations of institutions and their interaction with communities, we con-
struct a theoretical framework that clarifies the role of leaders and sheds light on their incen-
tives. We first analyze the assimilation process of communities in order to then understand
how the leader affects it. In our setting, immigrants assimilate due to their incentive to invest
in skills, which increase their earnings and in turn affect their identity. The processes of in-
vestment in skills and identity adaptation interact in a self-reinforcing way such that greater
investment leads to faster identity adaptation and vice versa. However, identity adaptation
does not only depend on an individual’s investment in skills, but also his exposure to other
group members as well as the leader. We consider different leader payoff functions taking
into account differences between e.g. religious leaders, business associations, foreign language
media and governments.
3 A MODEL OF COMMUNITY ASSIMILATION
In our model, there are n group members who represent a community of immigrants. They
interact with and are influenced by their host society S and the group’s leader L. Note that the
host society does not take any actions in our model; only the group members and the group
leader are active players. Group members invest in skills and adapt their identity over time
taking as given the leader’s policy. The leader can set norms and values and takes into account
how his choice influences the group member’s decision to invest in skills. We first consider the
assimilation process of the group members for a given group leader policy and then turn to the
resulting incentives for the leader.
3.1 Assimilation and Identity Adaptation of Group Members
In every period t, each group member goes first through a process of identity adaptation and
in a second step invests in skills. We discuss each of these processes in turn.
Identity Adaptation A group member’s identity, pti ∈ [0, pmax], describes the attachment an
individual has with his group, with higher pti indicating higher levels of group attachment. We
bound the space and assume that there is an upper level pmax. We fix ptS = pS = 0 for the
host society for all time periods and also take the leader’s identity as fixed for all t, ptL = pL ∈
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[0, pmax]. Thus, pti = 0 indicates full identification by group member iwith the host country and
pti = pL full identification with the group leader. The upper bound p
max shows how different
the group identity can be with respect to the host society.18
Group members do not actively choose their identity; instead it is adjusted passively. Our
approach can be seen as a natural extension to the classical approach in the literature on con-
tinuous trait formation.19 Instead of assigning weights to parents and the average society, as
is commonly done, a group member’s identity is given by a weighted average of values and
norms of (i) the host society and (ii) the leader as well as (iii) the past identity of the group
members themselves (including member i’s past identity). The weights on these three sources
of influence are determined as follows:
(i) Host Society Each group member is influenced by the host society, S. We denote the share
of influence given to that source by g(Ht−1i ) ∈ (0, 1) which is a strictly increasing function of
the previous period’s investment in skills, Ht−1i ∈ R+0 . This captures the fact that with greater
levels of investment, the group member is more exposed to the influence of the host society.
(ii) Leader Of the residual the leader captures a share λ ∈ (0, 1). The overall weight on the leader
is then given by λ(1 − g(Ht−1i )). The parameter λ is an indicator measuring the influence of
the leader compared to the group members, with a higher λ indicating more influence of the
leader.
(iii)Group Members The weight group member i assigns to group member j is denoted by dij(1−
λ)(1− g(Ht−1i )), such that
∑n
j=1 dij = 1 ∀ i. These weights between group members represent
the strength of their social connections, their influence network.
An overview of the process is provided in Figure 1.
Total Attention
Host Society
g(Ht−1i )
Within Group
1− g(Ht−1i )
1− λλ
Group Member NetworkGroup Leader
Figure 1: Attention Weights in Period t
18The bound pmax can be seen as a restriction imposed country, e.g. a ban on burqas.
19 Early work on this was done by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1973); Cavalli-Sforza (1981). Their approach has
been modified by Bisin and Verdier (2001), Vaughan (2013), Büchel et al. (2011) and Panebianco (2014).
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To illustrate the workings of within group influence further consider the example depicted
in Figure 2. The group consists of only two members, both of which are influenced by the host
society and the group leader. The two members can influence each other to varying degrees.
We consider the two extreme cases: (i) isolated group members where groups members do not
influence each other at all, and (ii) connected group members who assign the same weight to
each group member, including themselves. These two cases are depicted in Figure 2(a) and
Figure 2(b), respectively. Additionally, Figure 2 emphasizes that the leader as well as the host
society influence both group members, but the group members do not influence the leader or
the host society. The leader and the host society also have no impact on each other.
In case of the isolated group members, we have d11 = d22 = 1 and d12 = d21 = 0. The
identity adaption process is then given by
pt+1[iso],i =
[
1− g
(
Ht[iso],i
)]
·
{
λpL + (1− λ)pt[iso],i
}
,
where we have used the fact that pS = 0 so that the influence term for the host society disap-
pears.
By contrast, in the second example, where group members are connected, both group mem-
bers have equal weights, d11 = d22 = d12 = d21 = 12 , which results in the following identity
adaptation process:
pt+1[conn],i =
[
1− g
(
Ht[conn],i
)]
·
{
λpL + (1− λ)(1
2
pt[conn],i +
1
2
pt[conn],j)
}
.
L
1
2
Host Society
(a) Isolated Group Members
L
1
2
Host Society
(b) Connected Group Members
Figure 2: Example Social Structures
For a general network of connections, the identity adaptation process for group member i
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from pt−1i to p
t
i can then be summarized as follows:
pt+1i =
[
1− g (Hti )] ·
λpL + (1− λ)
n∑
j=1
dijp
t
j
 .
Skills Investment Group members invest in skills Hti ∈ R+0 . This measures a group member’s
effort to learn the language, to understand the norms and cultures of the host society.
Each period every group member simultaneously selects how much to invest in skills. The
payoff from investing is given by αf
(
Hti
)
. The function f(H) is strictly increasing and concave
in H . We also assume that it is three times continuously differentiable. Additionally, payoffs
from investment depend on a parameter α ∈ (0, 1), which can be interpreted globally or group
member specifically: (i) At a global level, α captures the degree of discrimination immigrants
face with lower α implying higher discrimination. (ii) At an individual level, αi reflects abil-
ity, with higher αi giving higher ability. In that case the parameter can differ between group
members.
Investing in skills is costly with the cost depending on the identity of the group member. For
ease of exposition we let this cost be linear in the investment level and specify it as c
(
pti
)×Hti .
Marginal costs are strictly increasing in pti, c
′ (pti) > 0, implying that immigrants who are more
deeply rooted in their culture and whose norms and values are more different face higher costs
understanding their new environment.
Finally, we assume that the marginal net return to additional investment at Hti = 0 is pos-
itive for all agents and levels of group identification, i.e. for all i and pti, αif
′(0) > c(pti). This
implies that all group members will choose a positive level of investment in skills for any given
level of group identity.
In summary, in each period t, group members have an identity pti and a stock of skills,
Hti , which determines their wealth αif(H
t
i ). These two variables now determine the leader’s
payoff.
3.2 The Leader’s Decision Problem
We distinguish between two types of leader, namely a leader who cares about the norms and
values of his group members per se, such as a religious leader, and a leader who is only inter-
ested in preserving group boundaries to the extent that this increases his profits such as foreign
language media. We refer to the former as an altruistic leader (AL) and to the latter as an extrac-
tive leader (EL).20 Both types of leaders would like their group to be as wealthy as possible,
20Note that for the leader payoff specification chosen, Equations (1) and (2) can be seen as two special cases of a
CES utility function. We believe that the two cases selected are of special interest and we highlight the difference
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but at the same time as strongly identified with the norms and values of the group as possible.
They therefore face a trade-off: if they advocate norms that differ greatly from those of the host
society, they will have a poor community, but one that is strongly identified with these values.
If, on the other hand, they choose norms that leads the community to assimilate more, then the
group members will be less identified with their group.
The leader selects a level of identity pL ∈ [0, pmax] to maximize their payoffs. Their payoffs
depend on the identity and the skill investment of all group members and we denote the iden-
tity and skill vector by, pt and Ht, respectively. The payoff functions of the two leader types are
then as follows.
Altruistic Leader We specify the altruistic leader’s payoff function in period t as
ΠAL(p
t, Ht) =
n∑
i=1
(
pti + kαif(H
t
i )
)
, (1)
where k denotes the weight the leader assigns to the wealth of the community relative to the
identity. An altruistic leader sees wealth and identity of his community as direct substitutes
within their overall wellbeing, an interpretation that is very similar to Carvalho and Koyama
(2011).21
Extractive Leader Unlike the altruistic leader, the extractive leader derives benefits from the
economic wealth of the community that is accumulated through skills investment. He only
cares about identity to the extent that it increases his payoffs that are appropriated. The payoff
function is then given by
ΠEL(p
t, Ht) =
n∑
i=1
(
pti × αif(Hti )
)
, (2)
In both cases, the leader can only set norms and values. He can neither set how much
his community is influenced by the norms and values he chooses, nor can he influence the
community structure. In reality, we would expect this to be possible, at least to some extent for
some leaders.22 Assuming that this is not feasible, restricts the influence of the leader. Even a
leader with such a limited influence will be sufficient to prevent assimilation of its immigrant
community.
between them.
21In their model, Rabbis substitute between donations and time spent at the synagogue.
22The family clans in San Francisco’s Chinatown could for example exclude group members.
15
4 ASSIMILATION WITH AND WITHOUT LEADER
We first study as a benchmark the assimilation process of a community without leader. This
serves to document why a leader is crucial to preserve the identity of an immigrant group and
to prevent their assimilation. We then turn to assimilation in the presence of a leader.
4.1 Benchmark Case: Assimilation without Leader
We consider in turn the optimal skill investment and identity adaptation.
Optimal Skills Investment Each period group members select a level of skills investment
based on the level of group identity they have in this period. The optimal level of investment
is given by the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
Hti≥0
αif
(
Hti
)− c (pti)Hti (3)
We solve this via a first order condition, which is both necessary and sufficient given our as-
sumptions and gives a unique interior solution.
αf ′(Hti )− c
(
pti
)
= 0 (4)
The solution depends on the level of identity pi as well as the parameter αi and we can therefore
write it as a function H∗(pi;αi), implicitly defined by Equation (4). Comparative statics follow
directly from the assumptions made in Section 3.
∂H∗(pi;αi)
∂pi
=
c′
(
pti
)
αf ′′[H∗(pi;αi)]
< 0 (5)
∂H∗(pi;αi)
∂α
= − f
′[H∗(pi;αi)]
αf ′′[H∗(pi;αi)]
> 0 (6)
The optimal investment level is decreasing in pi. As group members identify more with their
home group, their desired level of skills investment decreases, reflecting the greater costs of
such assimilation efforts. Furthermore, agents with higher αi have higher investment levels for
any given identity level pi. As the returns to skills investment increase for immigrants due to
reduced discrimination or higher ability, they find it beneficial to invest more.
Identity Adaptation Based on their skill investment in the last period, group members update
their identity pt+1i . Recall that the weight given to the host society is given by g(H
t
i ) with H
t
i
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chosen through function H∗(pti;αi). Taking this into account we define
gˆ(pi;αi) ≡ g(H∗(pi;αi)).
This function gˆ(pi;αi) maps every identity level p into (0, 1) for a given α. It is decreasing in p
as H∗(pi;αi) is a decreasing function in p and g(Hi) is increasing in H . Furthermore, for every
pi it is increasing in αi as a higher α implies a higher H∗, which leads to a higher weight on the
host society.
Next period’s identity, pt+1i , can then be written as a function of the previous period identity
levels as follows:
pt+1i =
[
1− gˆ (pti;αi)] ·

n∑
j=1
dijp
t
j
 (7)
We focus here on the long run outcome, the steady state of the system. The steady state
identity vector p is characterized by constant identity levels for each group member that satisfy:
(8),
pi = [1− gˆ (pi;αi)] ·

n∑
j=1
dijpj
 . (8)
The corresponding levels of steady state investment H i can then be recovered from the first
order condition in Equation (4). As investment is strictly positive for all identity levels, in the
steady state group members put a strictly positive amount of weight on the host society. We
now use this property to fully characterize the steady state identity vector for the benchmark
case without leader.
Proposition 1 (Steady State without Leader). ˙
Without a leader, group members assimilate fully, with their long run identities converging to zero.
The proof of this proposition, as well as all others, is in the Appendix. The intuition is
straightforward. Every group member has a positive level of investment in skills in each pe-
riod, which leads to a strictly positive weight on the host society. A greater weight on the host
society then leads step by step to a lower identification with the group. This might initially be
countered by the network, as a group member might be connected to other group members
that have a higher identity. Therefore, through the influence of peers, identity could initially
increase. Nonetheless, in the long run, with everyone investing in skills and this becoming
less costly as identification with the group falls, all immigrants will be fully assimilated. Note
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that our result is not driven by gˆ(0, α) approaching one but owed to the fact that gradually the
identity of all group members decreases.
4.2 Assimilation with Leader
We now introduce a leader with some fixed pL. This norm is not susceptible to the influences
from either the host society or any of the group members. We are again interested in the prop-
erties of the steady state.
The updating process of group member i’s identity is given by
pt+1i =
[
1− gˆ (pti;αi)]
λpL + (1− λ) n∑
j=1
dijp
t
j
 (9)
To guarantee uniqueness of steady state as well as global convergence of the system, we
impose an additional assumption on the leader’s identity pL.
Assumption 1 (Leader’s Identity).
pL <
gˆ(pi;αi)∣∣∣∂gˆ(pi;αi)∂pi ∣∣∣ ∀ pi, αi
The leader’s identity is bounded above by the term gˆ(pi;αi)/
∣∣∣∂gˆ(pi;αi)∂pi ∣∣∣, which is the weight
a group member assigns to the host society, divided by the change in the weight at some iden-
tity level pi. This term is larger, the higher the weight on the host society. This implies that the
identity of the leader can be more extreme, i.e. more differentiated from that of the host society,
the greater the weight a member assigns to the host society. The maximal group leader identity
also depends on the change in the weight on the host society. If an increase in identity p leads
to a large decrease in the weight assigned to the host society, then the maximal identity of the
group leader will be lower. Put differently, the assumption requires that the weight that group
members assign to the their group does not decline too rapidly in response to small decreases
in their identity pi for pL to obtain a high value. This assumption guarantees that the identity
adjustment process is sufficiently smooth and small changes in identity today do not have too
large of an impact tomorrow.
We can then establish the following result concerning the long run outcome of the setting
with a rigid leader.
Proposition 2 (Steady State with Rigid Leader).
In the model with a rigid leader:
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1. A steady state exists.
2. In every steady state, a group member’s identity is a strictly convex combination of the position of
the host society and that of the leader. There is no longer full assimilation into the host society.
3. If Assumption 1 holds the steady state is unique and the system converges globally.
The presence of a leader, who is not susceptible to any influence, guarantees that there is
no longer full assimilation. However, the group members will assimilate to some extent in
any steady state. If the steady state is unique, we can establish some results on the extent of
assimilation.
The extent of assimilation depends on various factors. To see this more clearly, we consider
again the two examples specified in Section 3. In the “isolated” case, group members were
influenced only by themselves, the leader and the host society. In the “connected” setting they
were additionally influenced by all other group members. The two examples are therefore
two extreme cases and provide a natural benchmark. We can readily extend them to n group
members, who either only listen to themselves or to all other group members. Steady state
identities for these cases then satisfy the following conditions:
p[iso],i =
λ
(
1− gˆ(p[iso],i;αi)
)
1− (1− λ)(1− gˆ(p[iso],i;αi))
pL (10)
p[conn],i =
λ
(
1− gˆ(p[conn],i;αi)
)
1− (1− λ) 1n
∑n
j=1
(
1− gˆ(p[conn],j ;αj)
)pL (11)
Details of the derivation can be found in the Appendix.
The expressions for the steady state identities show how the long run level of assimilation
depends on the group member characteristics in terms of αi as well as the social environment
described by λ, g and the strength of connections between group members.
Consider first the “isolated” setting and Equation (10) as this shows the comparative statics
the clearest. In this setting, the characteristics of others do not enter the steady state identity
of any given group member. The level of assimilation is decreasing in α, such that higher
individual ability or a lower level of discrimination lead to lower identity and thus a greater
level of assimilation. Likewise, a general increase in the influence of the host society, described
as gˆ(p;α) function that is higher everywhere, leads to greater assimilation. By contrast, an
increase in the influence of the leader (a higher λ) or a stronger projection of norms and values
(a higher pL) both lead to a higher pi and thus less assimilation.
The direction of these effects are all identical for the “connected” structure, as is immediate
from the symmetry of Equations (10) and (11). However, the connections show up in the de-
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nominator of Equation (11). Where previously only the term 1 − gˆ(p;α) of the group member
concerned appeared, the expression now shows the mean weight assigned to the group across
all group members, 1n
∑n
j=1
(
1− gˆ(p[conn],j ;αj)
)
. Whether this difference has an impact on the
long run level of assimilation depends on the degree of heterogeneity across group members.
If all group members have the same α, that is, they face the same level of discrimination or
have the same ability, then all group members will respond symmetrically and thus have the
same gˆ(p;α) function. The idiosyncratic level of gˆ(p;α) and the average across group members
are therefore the same. In consequence the long run identities of the group members are the
same, independently of whether they are “isolated” or “connected”. This insight readily carries
over to any social structures.
Remark 3 ( Ability αi = α ∀ i).
If all group members have the same level of ability, the steady state identity vector is invariant to the
structure of the group network.
However, if there is heterogeneity in group members, in terms of heterogeneity in ability
α, the individual and average gˆ(p;α) will differ. In consequence, there is now an attenuation
in the spread of long run identities in the “connected” structure relative to the “isolated” case:
for a group member i with high αi and low 1− gˆ(pi, αi) the exposure to influence from another
group member j with low αj and high 1 − gˆ(pi, αi) means an overall higher level of identity
in the long run for i. We expand on the attenuation effect by comparing the level of long run
assimilation when group members of different ability types assign more or less weight to each
other in a simple example with two types of group members.
Example with Two Different Group Member Types Suppose there are two types of group
members, A and B, such that A assigns a higher weight to the host society for a given identity.
We can think of A as a high ability group member, whereas B could be considered as a low
ability type. This implies that for a given identity levelA invests more in skills thanB resulting
in a higher weight on the host society for A. We denote by d ∈ [0, 1] the attention that A and B
assign to themselves relative to the other type. The steady state identity levels for A and B are
respectively given by:
pA = [1− gˆ(pA;αA)] {λpL + (1− λ) [dpA + (1− d) pB]} (12)
pB = [1− gˆ(pB;αB)] {λpL + (1− λ) [dpB + (1− d) pA]} (13)
Based on Equations (12) and (13) we can then analyze the effect of an increase in d and we find
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that ∂pA∂d > 0 and
∂pB
∂d < 0. This is summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 (Identity Spread for Different Types). Suppose there are two types of group members,
A and B such that A assigns a higher weight to the host society for a given identity. Then, the difference
between their steady state identities is decreasing in the weight they assign to each other.
Thus, our model also sheds light upon the effects of stratification according to ability. If
group cohesion is low and high and low ability group members do not influence each other,
then their levels of assimilation will differ greatly and we will observe very different outcomes
according to ability type. If the community is more connected, then skill investment and iden-
tities are less dispersed and there is greater equality in outcomes.
Discussion We have shown how the presence of an institution can lead to incomplete assimi-
lation outcomes, even in the long run, whereas without such an institution, we always obtain
full assimilation of the immigrant group.
Our result hinges crucially on the fact that the leader is completely immune to any influ-
ence from the host society and the group. We argue that this is a feature that holds in many
examples, such as that of the imams in Germany, which is discussed in depth in Halm et al.
(2012) and Ceylan (2010). A majority of the imams in Germany are employed by the Turkish
government and serve for only 4-5 years in Germany. Their knowledge of German is limited,
with only 50% of the imams taking German classes. Sermons are traditionally held in Turkish.
This sequence of imams a community is exposed to can be seen as such a rigid leader. By the
time the imams have somewhat adjusted to life in Germany, they have to return to Turkey and
a new imam arrives, one who is only familiar with the values and norms in Turkey. The situ-
ation is similar in the UK, as documented in Geaves (2008) where the vast majority of imams
comes from abroad, namely more than 90%. Also, similar to the situation in Germany, the ma-
jority of imams has only arrived in the UK five years ago and has been educated and raised in
an environment with very different norms and cultural values than those prevalent in the UK.
There are in fact a few imams that have been raised and educated in Britain. Nonetheless, even
those imams give sermons in Urdu, the prevalent language of Muslims in the UK. Our analysis
sheds light on the question of why these imams are predominantly recruited from the home
countries: they serve as a rigid institutions that preserves the values and norms of the home
countries and keep the community together. It is also plausible to assume that the governments
that try to influence their citizens abroad, such as the Korean or Turkish government, are not
susceptible to the influence of the host society. Even foreign-language media is often produced
in the home country, making it also little susceptible to influence from the host country Zhou
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and Cai (2002); Subervi-Velez (1986). Furthermore, leaders have an incentive to uphold norms
and values that are culturally distinct from the host country, as we will show in the next section.
In our setting, group members do not gain utility from belonging to a group. One could
easily introduce this as an additive element in Equation (3), the maximization problem of each
group member, that depends positively on identity. The outcome would remain exactly the
same, with group members assimilating fully in the long run. This is a key point of departure
from Bisin and Verdier (2000). In their model, parents have a preference regarding the cultural
trait of their children. In our model, one can interpret the different time periods as generations.
In this case, parents who are more identified with their group have children who will also be
more identified with the group. But their identification will decrease over time or rather across
generations as each generation keeps investing in skills. This is supported by evidence that
second generation immigrants have a lower identity and are less identified with their cultural
background than first generation immigrants Algan et al. (2012); Aleksynska and Algan (2010).
Group members invest in skills myopically, that is they assess the benefits of additional
skills in the current period only, without taking into account that they also profit from the
skills later on. If time periods are interpreted as generations, this approach seems appropriate.
However, even for shorter interpretations of time periods, immigrants might act myopically if
there is an expectation to return to their home country. Turkish immigrants in Germany are
commonly referred to as “Gastarbeiter”, guest workers who expected to settle temporarily and
who were thought to return to Turkey. Under these circumstances, it might make sense to only
invest a limited amount in skills. Last, even if the skill investment was not myopic, the long-run
outcomes would be unaffected. Speed of convergence may be affected and our model would
then give a lower bound on the speed of assimilation.
In the absence of an institution, there will be full assimilation based on the assumption that
immigrants find it beneficial to invest in skills. We find this assumption natural. One of the
most important determinants in migration is the hope of immigrants to increase their income.
They will therefore have an incentive to educate themselves at least to some extent and to adjust
to some of the norms and customs of their host country. Even if some group members might
not find it beneficial to invest in skills for a sufficiently high level of identity, there will be full
assimilation without a leader as long as they are connected and thus influenced by another
group member, who finds it beneficial to invest in skills. Then their identity will still adjust
until they also invest in skills. Thus, in the long run, there will be full assimilation, as long as
each group member who is not investing initially is connected to someone who does invest.
Last, it is worth noting that one can adjust the model such that the host society is also
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influenced by the immigrant group. This would simply result in different identity levels, but
would not change our main results: there is full assimilation in the absence of a leader and
incomplete assimilation in the presence of an institution.
5 STRATEGIC LEADER
Up to this point, the norms and the values of the leader have been taken as given and we have
not distinguished between the two types of leaders we introduced previously, the altruistic
and the extractive leader. In this section we will consider the strategic choice a leader faces.
We show that leaders have an incentive to choose norms and values that result in incomplete
assimilation. We consider first what norms and values the leader selects, depending on his
type and then continue to look at the impact of the community structure on a leader’s choice,
payoff and assimilation outcomes.
Leader Identity Choice
For the leader identity choice we focus on payoffs in the steady state and we further assume
that αi = α for all i. In addition we simplify the marginal cost function of investment in skills
such that c(pt) = c0 + c1pt with c0 > 0 and c1 > 0.
The leader’s payoff is a function of both identity and group members’ earnings αf(H). The
steady state skill investment is again determined by the steady state identity and so we rewrite
income as αfˆ(p;α) ≡ αf(H∗(p;α)). Note that fˆ(p;α) is decreasing in p. This derives from the
fact that f(H) is increasing in H and H∗(p;α) is decreasing in p.
The leader sets pL, which then has an impact on p as
p = [1− gˆ(p;α)] {λpL + (1− λ) p} , (14)
Given Assumption 1, ∂p∂pL is strictly positive. We then write p(pL) to emphasize that the steady
state identity depends on the norms and values the leader sets.
The altruistic and extractive leader’s maximization problem, respectively, is given by:
max
pAL
ΠAL(pAL) = n
[
p(pAL) + kαfˆ(p(pAL);α)
]
,
max
pEL
ΠEL(pEL) = n
[
αp(pEL)fˆ(p(pEL);α)
]
We first consider the possible assimilation outcomes under an altruistic leader.
Proposition 5 (Altruistic Leader). The optimal level of identity projected by the altruistic leader de-
pends on the shape of the function fˆ(p;α):
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1. If fˆ(p;α) is a convex function, the altruistic leader selects either the most extreme norms and
values, pmax, or full assimilation.
2. If fˆ(p;α) is a concave function, the altruistic leader chooses an intermediate level of group identity.
The implemented level of group identity depends positively on α. Thus, having group members
with a higher ability or facing lower discrimination leads to lower levels of assimilation.
Whether the leader is willing to support assimilation of the group depends on the properties
of fˆ(p;α). If the earnings function is convex, then this implies that a small decrease in p away
from pmax has only a small impact. In order to realize high earnings with a convex fˆ(p;α), the
identity has to decrease significantly. Therefore, if the earnings function is convex, the altruistic
leader chooses either full assimilation or no assimilation at all, depending on which extreme
identity yields the highest payoff. This depends on pmax as well as on α. If pmax is sufficiently
large, then the altruistic leader will always prefer the highest possible cultural distinction. But
for a smaller pmax, a higher αmakes full assimilation more likely. If the group member’s payoff
function is a concave function in p, then this implies, that a small decrease at pmax leads to a
large increase in investment in skills and thus to a large increase in earnings. The leader can
increase the community’s income drastically by reducing cultural distinction. Thus, with a
concave earnings function the leader will prefer the community to assimilate to some extent,
assuming that the bound pmax is sufficiently large to guarantee an interior solution. The level
of assimilation depends positively on ability or negatively on discrimination. This implies that
with an altruistic leader who finds it beneficial to assimilate to some extent, an environment
that provides opportunities for the immigrant community will lead to worse assimilation of
said community.
Similar to the altruistic leader, the extractive leader might also choose the most extreme
level of norms and values or an intermediate value.
Proposition 6 (Extractive Leader). Unlike the altruistic leader, the extractive leader will never choose
full assimilation. The optimal level of identity projected by the extractive leader depends on the shape of
the function fˆ(p;α):
1. If the elasticity of fˆ(p;α) is below one, the extractive leader selects pmax.
2. If fˆ(p;α) is a concave function, the extractive leader chooses an intermediate level of group iden-
tity. In case of an interior maximum, an increase in α leads to an increase in the group identity.
Note first that it is never optimal for the extractive leader to set pL = 0. If he were to
do so, he would earn zero profits. A small increase in identity would yield a strictly positive
payoff. It is on the other hand possible that the extractive leader will choose pmax. This is the
case whenever investment in skills is not affected too much by a change in identity, that is, if
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the elasticity of fˆ(p;α) is smaller than one, formally 1 > −∂fˆ(p;α)∂p pfˆ(p;α) . The leader being an
extremist can also occur, if the earnings function is convex. Note that this is only a necessary,
but not a sufficient condition.
Last, the leader might set norms and values that are not extreme, but that still prevent full
assimilation. A sufficient condition for this to occur is the concavity of fˆ(p;α) and again, that
pmax is sufficiently large so as to have an interior solution. But even if the earnings function
is convex, positive cultural distinction can emerge. Similar to the altruistic, an increase in α is
associated with an increase in group identity.
The effect of a decrease in discrimination depends on the type of leader and the properties
of the earnings function. In case of an altruistic leader, who faces a convex function fˆ(p;α),
a decrease in discrimination or having higher ability group members is beneficial and makes
integration more likely. In this case, a restriction on pmax also makes assimilation more likely.
But the impact of an increase of discrimination is very different when considering an altruistic
leader who faces an concave earnings function. In this case, a reduction in discrimination will
lead to lower assimilation, less investment in skills and a more distinct identity. In case of
an extremist extractive leader, a reduction in discrimination simply increases payoffs of the
leader, without having an impact on the actual norms and values chosen. If the extractive
leader chooses cultural distinction without being extreme, then lower discrimination or higher
ability group members lead to higher cultural distinction.
Which type of leader leads to higher levels of assimilation in the case of interior solutions
depends on the parameter k, the weight assigned by the altruistic leader to wealth relative to
identity. The level of assimilation that the leader chooses is increasing in k and for sufficiently
high k, will approach complete assimilation. Likewise for sufficiently low k, the altruistic leader
will favour a level of assimilation that is approaching the extremist position. As a consequence,
the altruistic leader may implement a level of assimilation that is higher or lower than that of
the extractive leader for different k.
Impact of Network on Leader Payoffs We are interested in whether it is better for each type
of leader to have a more or less connected group. To see the impact of different network struc-
tures on the leader payoffs, we again return to the structures in Figure 2, namely “isolated”
and “connected” social structures, and consider an example with fixed functional forms. The
parameters used in our specifications are given in Table 1.
Based on these assumptions on the functional forms and parameters we can show that the
impact of the network structure is very different for the two types of leader as can be seen in
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Table 1: Baseline Specification
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Figure 3: Leader Payoffs and Networks
For an altruistic leader, it is beneficial if group members are not connected to each other,
whereas for an extractive leader the opposite is the case. To gain some intuition for this result,
recall that if group members assign less weight to each other, then their steady state identities
are more dispersed and the same holds for their investment in skills. The group member with
a high α will end up with a much lower identity than the group member with the low α. And
the difference in the identities is lower if the group members are influenced by each other. A
high ability group member will invest less in skills in the connected network as his identity is
also shaped by the low ability group member and vice versa. This also has an impact on the
leader’s payoff. In case the group members identities and earnings are very dispersed, i.e. one
group member with high earnings, but low identification and another one with low earnings
and high identity, an extractive leader will never be able to gain a high payoff. The high ability
group member has the earnings to pay for the service of the leader, but is not interested in it,
whereas the low ability group member would like to buy the service, but he cannot afford it.
In the end an extractive leader will earn very little from both types of agents and therefore he
prefers them to be connected so that they can influence each other. But this is different for the
altruistic leader. An altruistic leader benefits both from his community being wealthy as well
as identified with the norms and values. He therefore prefers both types of group members,
the high and low ability group members to do what they want. Namely, the high ability type
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specializes in acquiring skills and has therefore high earnings, whereas a low ability type will
focus on fulfilling the norms and values that the leader prescribes. If they influence each other,
then the identity of the low ability group member falls more than his earnings increase, which
drives this result, as can be seen in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Network, Identity and Earnings
Figure 4(a) shows that the identity of the high ability type increases only modestly com-
pared to the decrease in identity of the low ability type. On the other hand, the earnings of
the low ability types are almost zero and they almost do not differ, whereas the earnings of the
high ability types decrease somewhat when they are influenced by a low ability group member
(Figure 4(b)).
Discussion Our findings for the altruistic leader with a convex function fˆ(p;α) are in line with
Carvalho and Koyama (2011). As mentioned previously, they have a similar payoff function for
rabbis in Eastern Europe and Germany. They document that Jewish communities in Germany
assimilated to German customs. Rabbis changed the religious procedures such that less time
was required to be spent at the Synagogue. Additionally, organ music was introduced, tradi-
tionally a Christian custom. Sermons started to be held in German instead of Hebrew. All these
changes can be seen as increased assimilation to German customs and traditions. However, the
assimilation took place at the same time as the building of many new synagogues. During that
period, German communities became very wealthy and invested in the construction of many
new synagogues.23 But on the other hand, the communities in Hungary started creating norms
23Note that we are only interested in assimilation as far as it concerns economic outcomes or affects similarities
in preferences regarding public goods. So, even though the Jewish community persisted it was on many important
issues not that different from Christian communities.
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and customs that required their followers to spend more time at the synagogue. They also
imposed dress codes that emphasized the difference between the Jewish community and the
Hungarian society. Carvalho and Koyama (2011) argue that these difference in development
stems from the diverse economic environments: Germany was further developed, making it
easier to find well-paid employment. Assimilation was therefore more profitable in such an
environment.
However, it is not clear that religious leaders are in fact always altruistic. Ceylan (2010, p.
61), argues that for the majority of Imams coming from Turkey to Germany the most important
driving force is money. The imams can earn more in Germany, than they could ever make in
Turkey. This then is more likely to make them an extractive leader than an altruistic leader. If
this is the case, then Turkish Imams face very different incentives from other religious leader,
which might explain why the assimilation of Muslims seems to be different from that of other
religious groups.24 Foreign-language media and ethnic business associations also seem to fall
into the category of extractive leaders. In all the examples given in Section 2, observers note
how strict the leaders were, how much control they exerted on the respective communities.
These type of leaders establish a regime of total intolerance and punish any deviant behavior,
which is understandable given their payoff function. They cannot sustain their position if the
community fully assimilates. And one way to prevent full assimilation is to reduce profits from
investment in skills, profits from learning the language. The Chinese-language media in the US
has been instrumental in the reduced payoff from learning English. They advocate education,
but at the same time help build and improve ethnic networks in order to prevent assimilation.
What has emerged is a very well educated, wealthy parallel society of Chinese immigrants
who often only speak insufficient English, but still have high incomes from their networks, see
Zhou and Cai (2002). In a similar spirit, Latin American media outlets have contents that tend
towards socialization into Spanish society Subervi-Velez (1986). This clearly makes investment
in host country language more costly and at least in case of Hispanic immigrants decreases
their earnings McManus (1990); Borjas (2013).
Additionally, it is of interest to see the impact of the community structure on the leader
payoffs and how the community structure preferred by leader differs. Altruistic leaders have
higher payoffs from their community if the members are more isolated, whereas extractive
leaders benefit more if the community is more connected. We argue that collectivist societies
are more likely to have connected social structures, whereas individualistic societies have a
more isolated networks structure.25 According to a standard classification based on the work
24See Bisin et al. (2008), Constant et al. (2006) and Haug (2008) for evidence of this.
25For a formal definition of collectivism and individualism see Hofstede (1984).
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of Hofstede (1984), China, Turkey, Mexico and South Korea are considered to be collectivist
societies. On the other hand, Western European countries and especially the US are individ-
ualistic societies. It might be the case that the assimilation failure along religious lines that
occurred in the US and which was mainly of Western European groups was due to the inter-
action of an isolated network and an altruistic leader who would especially profit from such
a community. On the other hand, we have shown the presence of extractive institutions for
Chinese, Turkish, Mexican as well as Korean immigrants. Again, this emergence might be due
to the fact that extractive leaders profit more from these connected social structures.
In our setting, a reduction in discrimination will lead to an increase in payoffs for an extrem-
ist leader. Additionally, lower discrimination leads under most circumstances to an increase in
cultural distinction. The exception is an altruistic leader who decides between full assimilation
and the maximal cultural distinction: in this case lower discrimination makes full assimilation
more likely. It is often argued in policy debates that lower discrimination leads immigrants to
assimilate more. In our model, the opposite is true. It highlights that lowering barriers to the
job market will not lead to cultural assimilation in the presence of leaders, but instead – through
the response of leaders who capture some of the gains from lower barriers – may create higher
level of cultural distinction.
Last, note that in our model, the higher exposure to the host society does not lead to an
increase in identity. Bisin et al. (2010) argues that higher cultural distinction is chosen in a
neighborhood where host society and immigrant groups are more mixed.26 In our model,
exposure to the host country should rather be interpreted as consuming media of the host
country or having obtained education in the host country. All these factors are associated with
a lower identity Bisin et al. (2010); Subervi-Velez (1986); Zhou and Cai (2002).
6 CONCLUSION
We develop a model of the assimilation process of an immigrant community with a strate-
gic leader capturing the evolution of the skills and identities of community members. In the
absence of an institution, our setting predicts complete assimilation. A rigid institution can
prevent this and leads to persistent differences in norms and values between the immigrant
group and the host society.
Furthermore, we study the incentives for leaders to prevent assimilation under two payoff
specifications that both value the economic success and identification of community members
26In a similar spirit, Currarini et al. (2009) show that racial groups show more homophily if the groups are of
equal size.
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with the group. We find that both under altruistic and extractive leaders extremist outcomes are
possible. This means the institutions distance themselves as much as possible from the norms
and values of the host society. However, altruistic leadership payoffs may also result in full
assimilation, if the benefits that this outcome generates for the community can be captured to
a sufficient extent by the leadership. This outcome is never possible for extractive leaderships,
who rely on the continued identification of the group members with their origin culture to
generate payoffs.
In addition to these extreme outcomes, both types of leadership may find it optimal to create
the conditions for intermediate, but still incomplete assimilation. The effect of an increase in
discrimination on identity depends on the type of leader as well as on the properties of the
earnings function. Whether the community is tightly knit also has an impact on a leader’s
payoff. In particular, an altruistic leader benefits more from a community that is less connected,
whilst an extractive leader prefers a community that is more connected.
Our model helps understand why there seems to be a strong preference for religious leaders
that come from the home country, why leaders prefer to limit investment in skills, why Muslim
leaders might be different from other religious leaders. We additionally analyze the impact of
the economic environment on leader’s incentive regarding assimilation or the lack thereof.
We do not address the question of competition between groups, but rather focus on small
minorities that have a negligible impact on the host society. Additionally if groups are com-
petitors such as described in Munshi and Wilson (2008), then we would expect outcomes to
differ.
We have argued that institutions are instrumental in preventing assimilation and keeping
the community together. However, it might very well be that only individuals who are of a
certain type are influenced by the institution, that is, there is self-selection of group members.
Suppose for example that Chinese immigrants who consume more Chinese language media
are of a certain type. This type is more likely to go to consume home country media and they
have different values. This will not imply that the language media is instrumental in promoting
these values. In our model, a Chinese immigrant will only be able to hold onto different values
if the media is present, either because it shapes his views or simply because it affirms them. We
have provided several case studies which argue that the leaders are indeed instrumental. In
the end, this question is an empirical one. To test our hypothesis rigorously, it would require to
have randomly allocated leaders, community members that cannot leave their group and will
be influenced by the leader no matter his position and assimilation and integration variables
that measure the impact of leader characteristics on the group.
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In closing, we highlight the importance of leaders for shaping norms and values in the poli-
cies pursued by Atatürk. He initially used Imams to mobilize the Turkish people in the Turk-
ish War of Independence and later founded an institution to control the preaching of Imams.
Imams were employed by this institution and were forced to teach a state conform and moder-
ate Islam, often against the wishes of the leaders themselves. Still, the incentive structur created
by Atatürk had an impact and it affected the change in communities he aimed for Ceylan (2010).
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1 - Steady State in the Benchmark Case without Leader
We can verify by inspection that pi = 0 ∀ i is a solution to the steady state condition in Equa-
tion (8). It remains to be shown that this is the unique such steady state and that the system
described by Equation (7) converges towards it.
We first rewrite Equation (7) in matrix form as follows:
pt+1 =
[
I −G (pt)]Dpt (15)
where pt is the vector of identities. I is the identity matrix and we define G
(
pt
)
to be the
n × n matrix with diagonal elements Gii
(
pt
)
= g(pti;αi) and zeros elsewhere. D is the group
member influence matrix defined by Dij = dij . Note that for this proof a superscript t applied
to a matrix such as D denotes D taken to the tth power whilst a superscript on a vector such as
p refers to the vector p in period t.
Solving backwards yields
pt =
t−1∏
s=0
{[I −G (ps)]D} p0
=
t−1∏
s=0
[I −G (ps)]Dtp0.
Now, the long run behavior of pt as t→∞ depends on the behavior of limt→∞
∏t−1
s=0 [I −G (ps)]
and limt→∞Dt.
Consider first limt→∞
∏t−1
s=0 [I −G (ps)]. This is a diagonal matrix with element (i, i) given by
lim
t→∞
t−1∏
s=0
[1− g(psi ;αi)] = 0
as g(psi ;αi) ∈ (0, 1) by assumption. Thus,
lim
t→∞
t−1∏
s=0
[I −G (ps)] = 0.
Furthermore, as D is row stochastic limt→∞Dt is bounded so that we have
lim
t→∞
t−1∏
s=0
[I −G (ps)]Dtp0 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 - Steady State with Leader
Existence and Characterization as Convex Combination
The updating process maps a vector of group member identities into a new identity vector,
p′ = Φ(p), where p′ is next period’s identity vector, which is a function of today’s identity p. A
steady state identity vector is a fixed point of Φ(·).
The domain and co-domain of Φ(·) are both [0, pmax]n, which are compact convex subsets
of Euclidean space. Continuity of Φ(·) follows from its definition in Equation (9). Therefore by
Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem, Φ(·) has a fixed point and there exists a steady state.
Next we show that at any fixed point the identity of every group member is a strict combi-
nation of the leader’s payoff and the host society, that is
pi ∈ (0, pL) ∀i.
We proceed by contradiction. Support first p˜ is a fixed point of Φ(p) and the exists a player
such that p˜i = 0. Then Φi(p˜) = [1− g (p˜i;αi)]
[
λpL + (1− λ)
∑n
j=1 dijpj
]
which is strictly
greater than zero because g (p˜i;αi) < 1, λ > 0 and pL > 0. p˜ thus is not a fixed point, de-
livering the contradiction.
Now suppose that there was a player for which p˜i ≥ pL. Label the player with the highest
p˜i as imax. Then p˜imax ≥ pL. Again Φimax(p˜) = [1− g (p˜imax ;αimax)]
[
λpL + (1− λ)
∑n
j=1 dijpj
]
which is strictly less than p˜imax as g (p˜i;αi) > 0. This implies p˜ is not a fixed point, delivering
the contraction.
Uniqueness and Convergence
To show uniqueness and convergence of the fixed point we will show that under Assumption
1 the updating process with a leader described by Equation (9) is a contraction under a suitable
norm and then use Blackwell’s contraction mapping theorem. The proof implies existence and
uniqueness of the steady state as well as global convergence towards the steady state.
Label again Φ(p) the one period updating process of group member identity vector p yield-
ing next period vector p′. Then for Φ(p) to be a contraction we need to show that for every two
n-dimensional identity vectors p 6= q and for some norm ‖·‖ and scalar c < 1:
‖Φ(p)− Φ(q)‖ ≤ c ‖p− q‖ < ‖p− q‖
Now, from Equation (9) and assumptions on g(·) we know that Φ(p) is continuous and differen-
tiable everywhere. The condition for a contraction can then be expressed in terms of a property
on the Jacobian J (Φ(p)) as follows.27 Φ(p) is a contraction if there exists a matrix norm ‖ · ‖ of
J and scalar c < 1 such that for every p
‖J (Φ(p)) ‖ ≤ c
The matrix norm we use is the norm induced by the∞-vector norm defined as
‖A‖∞ = max
i
∑
j
Aij

A sufficient condition for Φ(p) to be a contraction is thus:
max
i
∑
j
Jij (Φ(p))
 < 1
Computing the elements of the Jacobian
∂Φi(p)
∂p′i
= [1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λ)Dii +
λpL + (1− λ)∑
j
(Dijpj)

[
−αi∂gˆ(pi;αi)
∂pi
]
∂Φi(p)
∂p′j
= [1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λ)
∑
j 6=i
Dij
we then derive the following condition:
‖J (Φ(p)) ‖
= max
i
[1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λ) +
λpL + (1− λ)∑
j
(Dijpj)

[
−∂gˆ(pi;αi)
∂pi
]
≤max
i
[
[1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λ) + pmax
[
−∂gˆ(pi;αi)
∂pi
]]
<max
i
[
[1− gˆ(pi;αi)] + pmax
[
−∂gˆ(pi;αi)
∂pi
]]
<1.
The line following the first≤ provides an upper bound for all network structures and all initial
values of p. The subsequent step then ensures the condition holds for all λ, in particular as
27See Judd (1998, Theorem 5.4.1) for the approach adopted here.
λ→ 0. This condition further simplifies to
pmax <
g(pi;αi)
|∂gˆ(pi;αi)∂pi |
∀ i ∈ N and ∀ pi ∈ [0, pmax]
which delivers Assumption 1. It then follows from the contraction mapping theorem that Φ(·)
has a unique steady state and the system converges globally to the steady state.
Derivation of Steady State Identities in Equations (10) and (11)
Recall the matrix notation from the proof of Proposition 1. Using this notation and Equation 9,
the system of equations characterizing the steady state can be written as
p = [I −G (p)] [λpL1+ (1− λ)Dp]
where 1 stands for the n× 1 vector of ones . We solve for the vector of steady state identities p
p = [I − (1− λ) [I −G (p)]D]−1 [I −G (p)]1λpL
The network structure enters this expression in the inverse on the right hand side only. We
define:
A ≡ [I − (1− λ) [I −G (p)]D]
such that p = A−1 [I −G (p)]1λpL. Note that [I −G (p)] is a diagonal matrix. We can then
proceed to solve for the identity vector for the two structures in our example.
Isolated Case: Group member puts no weight on other group members
In the “isolated” structure, D is equal to the identity matrix I . Thus:
p[iso] =
[
I − (1− λ)
[
I −G
(
p[iso]
)]]−1 [
I −G
(
p[iso]
)]
1λpL
andA[iso] is a diagonal matrix with element {i, i} given by 1−(1− λ) [1− gˆ (pi, αi)]. The inverse
A−1[iso] is thus also a diagonal matrix with element {i, i} equal to 11−(1−λ)[1−gˆ(pi,αi)] . It follows that
A−1[iso]
[
I −G
(
p[iso]
)]
is a diagonal matrix with element {i, i} equal to
1−
[
1− gˆ
(
p[iso],i, αi
)]
1− (1− λ)
[
1− gˆ
(
p[iso],i, αi
)]
Adding the remaining elements we can derive an expression for p[iso],i as required:
p[iso],i =
1−
[
1− gˆ
(
p[iso],i, αi
)]
1− (1− λ)
[
1− gˆ
(
p[iso],i, αi
)]λpL
Connected Case: Group member puts weight on other group members
In the “connected” structure,D is an n×nmatrix with every element equal to 1n . ThusA[conn] is
a matrix with diagonal element {i, i} given by 1− 1−λn gˆ (pi, αi) and off diagonal element {i, j}
given by − (1− λ) [1− gˆ (pi, αi)] for all j 6= i. We use the shorthand ai = (1− λ) [1− gˆ (pi, αi)]
to simplify the next steps.
The inverse A−1[conn] can be computed from the definition:
A−1[conn]A[conn] = I
which describes a system of n× n equations. Multiplying out the left hand side and collecting
terms we get for the diagonal elements
A−1[conn],[i,i] −
n∑
k=1
A−1[conn],[i,k]ak = 1 (16)
and for the off diagonal elements in position {i, j}
A−1[conn],[i,j] −
n∑
k=1
A−1[conn],[i,k]ak = 0 (17)
for all j 6= i. Note that any two expressions corresponding to row i share the term with the
sum. Thus subtracting the expressions for two off diagonal elements in the same row yields:
A−1[conn],[i,j] = A
−1
[conn],[i,k] ∀ j, k 6= i (18)
Subtracting any off diagonal from the diagonal element of the same row yields:
A−1[conn],[i,i] = 1 +A
−1
[conn],[i,j] (19)
Substituting Equations (19) and (19) into Equation (17) then yields:
A−1[conn],[i,j]
(
1−
n∑
k=1
ak
)
− ai = 0
and therefore A−1[conn],[i,j] =
ai
(1−∑nk=1 ak) . It follows that A−1[conn],[i,j] = 1 + A−1[conn],[i,j] = 1 +
ai
(1−∑nk=1 ak) =
1−∑nk=1,k 6=i ak
(1−∑nk=1 ak) Some algebra computingA−1[conn]
[
I −G
(
p[conn]
)]
shows that many
elements cancel and the steady state identities are then given by
p[conn],i =
λ
(
1− gˆ(p[conn],i;αi)
)
1− (1− λ) 1n
∑n
j=1
(
1− gˆ(p[conn],j ;αj)
)pL
Comparative Statics on Steady State Identities
Comparative statics are can be computed by the implicit function theorem. We start with the
“isolated” case and rewrite Equation (10) as:
F (p[iso],i;αi;λ; pL) = p[iso],i
{
1− (1− λ)
[
1− gˆ
(
p[iso],i, αi
)]}
−
{
1−
[
1− gˆ
(
p[iso],i, αi
)]}
λpL = 0
The partial derivative with respect to p[iso],i is:
∂F
∂p[iso],i
=
{
1− (1− λ)
[
1− gˆ(p[iso],i;αi)
]}
+
∂gˆ(p[iso],i;αi)
∂pi
{
λpL + (1− λ)p[iso],i
}
> gˆ(p[iso],i;αi) +
∂gˆ(p[iso],i;αi)
∂pi
pL
> 0
where the final inequality follows from Assumption 1. The remaining partial derivatives can
be signed directly:
∂F
∂αi
=
∂gˆ(p[iso],i;αi)
∂αi
[
λpL + (1− λ)p[iso],i
]
> 0
∂F
∂λ
=
[
1− gˆ(p[iso],i;αi)
]
(p− pL) < 0
∂F
∂pL
= −λ
[
1− gˆ(p[iso],i;αi)
]
< 0
The signs of the effects of parameters αi, λ and pL then follow directly from the implicit function
theorem.
For the “connected” case the derivation and signs of comparative statics are analogous to
the case with “isolated” group members and omitted here.
Proof of Proposition 4
The result follows from the implicit function theorem applied to the system of equations de-
scribing the steady state (Equations (12) and (13)). We first rewrite the system in terms of
F (pA, pB; d, pL) = 0:
[1− gˆ(pA;αA)] {λpL + (1− λ) [dpA + (1− d) pB]} − pA = 0
[1− gˆ(pB;αB)] {λpL + (1− λ) [dpB + (1− d) pA]} − pB = 0
Next take the partial derivatives that form the Jacobian for the endogenous variables (pA, pB)
as well as the derivatives with respect to the parameter d. The effect of a change in the param-
eter d can then be computed using the implicit function theorem as:
∂pi
∂d
=
−|Ji(d)|
|J |
where J is the Jacobian of F with respect to endogenous variables and Ji(θ) is the same matrix
with column i replaced by the vector of partial derivatives with respect to parameter θ. We
compute |J | and |JA(d)|. The necessary partial derivatives are given by:
∂Fi
∂pi
= [1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λ)d− ∂gˆ(pi;αi)
∂pi
{λ+ (1− λ) [dpi + (1− d) pj ]} − 1 < 0 (20)
∂Fi
∂pj
= [1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λ)(1− d) > 0 (21)
∂Fi
∂d
= [1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λ) (pi − pj) = (+) · (pi − pj) (22)
Equation (20) can be signed using Assumption 1. The sign of Equation (21) follows directly
from gˆ(pi;αi) ∈ (0, 1). Equation (22) adopts the sign of (pi − pj) which for our setting and ∂FA∂d
is negative.
The determinant of the Jacobian is then given by
|J | =∂FA
∂pA
∂FB
∂pB
− ∂FA
∂pB
∂FB
∂pA
>0
The inequality follows by recognising that Assumption 1 implies that |∂Fi∂pi | > |
∂Fi
∂pj
| for both
i = A and i = B. To see this note that the partial derivatives of F (· used are connected to the
Jacobian of the updating operator Φ(p) used in the proof of Proposition 2 above:
∂Fi
∂pi
+ 1 =
∂Φi
∂pi
∂Fi
∂pj
=
∂Φi
∂pj
Furthermore, the proof to Proposition 2 also established that Assumption 1 ensured that ∂Φi∂pi +
∂Φi
∂pj
< 1 which implies here that ∂Fi∂pj +
∂Fi
∂pj
< 0. Given the signs on the partial derivatives of
F (·) it follows that |∂Fi∂pi | > |
∂Fi
∂pj
|. It is then immediate that the first part of the expression for |J |
is larger than the second and thus the over sign is positive.
The determinant of the modified Jacobian JA(d) can be signed as follows:
|JA(d)| =∂FA
∂d
∂FB
∂pB
− ∂FA
∂pB
∂FB
∂d
= [1− gˆ(pA;αA)(pA)] (1− λ) (pA − pB) ·{
[1− gˆ(pB;αB)] (1− λ)d− ∂gˆ(pB;αB)
∂pB
{λpL + (1− λ) [dpB + (1− d) pA]} − 1
}
− [1− gˆ(pA;αA)] (1− λ)(1− d) · [1− gˆ(pB;αB)] (1− λ) (pB − pA)
= [1− gˆ(pA;αA)] (1− λ) (pA − pB) ·{
[1− gˆ(pB;αB)] (1− λ)− ∂gˆ(pB;αB)
∂pB
{λpL + (1− λ) [dpB + (1− d) pA]} − 1
}
> [1− gˆ(pA;αA)] (1− λ) (pA − pB) ·{
[1− gˆ(pB;αB)]− ∂gˆ(pB;αB)
∂pB
{pL} − 1
}
= [1− gˆ(pA;αA)] (1− λ) (pA − pB) ·{
[−gˆ(pB;αB)]− ∂gˆ(pB;αB)
∂pB
{pL}
}
> 0
The final inequality is due to the multiplication of two negative components: The first part has
the sign of pA − pB , which is negative as αA > αB . The second part is negative by Assumption
1, applied here to pB .
Reassembling, we can now sign the effect of d:
∂pA
∂d
=
−|JA(d)|
|J |
=− (+)
(+)
<0
Thus with pA < pB an increase in d decreases pA and thus implies greater differences.
Proof of Proposition 5 and 6: Altruistic and Extractive Leader
We establish first that p(pL) is an increasing function in pL. To see this recall Equation (14)
p = [1− gˆ(p;αi)] {λpL + (1− λ) p} .
Differentiating with respect to pL yields
∂p
∂pL
=
λ (1− gˆ(p;α))
1 + ∂gˆ(p;α)∂p (λpL + (1− λ)p)− (1− λ) (1− gˆ(p;α))
which is strictly positive under Assumption 1. This strictly monotonously increasing relation-
ship between pL and p allows us to study the leader problem from the perspective of p. Note
also that the above conditions imply that if pL = pmax, the resulting p is generally below pmax.
Altruistic Leader
Recall the payoff function of the altruistic leader
ΠAL(p) = n
[
p+ kfˆ(p;α)
]
The FOC is given by the first derivative of the payoff function
1 + αk
∂fˆ(p;α)
∂p
= 0 (23)
⇐⇒ 1 + kαf ′ [H∗(p;α)] ∂H
∗(p;α)
∂p
= 0 (24)
with the sign of the second order condition equal to
f ′′ (H∗)
[
∂H∗(p;α)
∂p
]2
+ f ′ (H∗)
∂2H∗(p;α)
∂p2
=
(
c21
α2f ′′(H)
){
1− f ′ (H∗) f
′′′ (H∗)
[f ′′ (H∗)]2
}
As ∂H
∗(p;α)
∂p < 0 (see Equation (5)) the altruistic leader objective function is thus strictly concave
if
1− f ′ (H∗) f
′′′ (H∗)
[f ′′ (H∗)]2
> 0 (25)
A sufficient condition is f ′′′(H) < 0. If f ′′′(H) > 0, then the condition remains valid if f ′′′(H)
is not “too high”.
We can then distinguish two cases:28
Case 1 If Equation (25) is positive over the domain of p that can be achieved with pL ∈ [0, pmax],
then if there exists a pL for which the FOC holds, it is a global interior maximum.
Case 2 If Equation (25) is negative over the domain of p, then the global maximum is either
pL = 0 or pL = pmax.
If Case 1 is satisfied, we can study the comparative statics of the solution with respect to the
parameter α. Defining F as the left hand side of the FOC in Equation (24) the effect of α on the
optimal level of p is given by
∂p
∂α
= −
∂F
∂α
∂F
∂p
We have
∂F
∂α
= f ′′(H∗) + αf ′′′(H∗)
∂H∗
∂α
= f ′′ (H∗)− f ′′′ (H∗) f
′ (H∗)
f ′′ (H∗)
= f ′′ (H∗)
{
1− f ′ (H∗) f
′′′ (H∗)
[f ′′ (H∗)]2
}
< 0
28There is also the third case if Equation (25) is equal to zero. But this is knife edge and therefore we deemphasize
it at here.
where the inequality follows from Equation (25) being positive in Case 1. Further
∂F
∂p
= c21k + αf
′′ (H∗)
∂H∗
∂p
> 0
Reassembling terms yields
∂p
∂α
= −(−)
(+)
> 0
as required.
Extractive Leader
Recall the payoff function of the extractive leader
ΠAL(p) = n
[
pfˆ(p;α)
]
In terms of fˆ(p;α), the first derivative of the payoff function is
n
{
fˆ(p;α) + p
∂fˆ(p;α)
∂p
}
This is always positive if the elasticity of fˆ(p;α) is sufficiently small for any p:
− p
fˆ(p;α)
∂fˆ(p;α)
∂p
< 1
In this case the leader sets the pL = pmax.
In case of an interior solution, the second order condition is of interest:
f ′(H∗)
c1
αf ′′(H∗)
+ p
c21
α2f ′′(H∗)
(1− f
′(H∗)f ′′′(H∗)
[f ′′(H∗)]2
) (26)
=
c1
αf ′′(H∗)
(
f ′(H∗) + p
c1
α
(
1− f
′(H∗)f ′′′(H∗)
[f ′′(H∗)]2
))
(27)
For the second order condition to be negative,
f ′(H∗) + p
c1
α
(
1− f
′(H∗)f ′′′(H∗)
[f ′′(H∗)]2
)
> 0 (28)
Note that equation (28) contains expression (25). Thus, the expression here is positive – and the
objective function concave – whenever it is the case of the altruistic leader.
The two case distinction can then be applied as for the altruistic leader with the proviso that
p = 0 is never optimal as the first derivative of the payoff function is strictly positive at zero.
Thus, if a corner solution is optimal, it is p = p˜max.
Again, in case of an interior solution we are interested in the impact of α on the optimal
weight set by the leader. The impact of α on p is determined by
∂p
∂α
= −
∂fˆ(p;α)
∂α + p
∂2fˆ(p;α)
∂p∂α
2∂fˆ(p;α)∂p + p
∂2fˆ(p;α)
∂p2
We know that the denominator is negative and so
sign
(
∂p
∂α
)
= sign
(
∂fˆ(p;α)
∂α
+ p
∂2fˆ(p;α)
∂p∂α
)
.
Recall that
∂H∗
∂α
= − f
′(H∗)
αf ′′(H∗)
.
The numerator can then be written as
f ′(H∗)
∂H∗
∂α
+ p
{
f ′′(H∗)
∂H∗
∂p
+ f ′(H∗)
∂2H∗
∂p∂α
}
=
[f ′(H∗)]2
αf ′′(H∗)
+ p
{
c1
α
−f ′(H∗)
αf ′′(H∗)
+ f ′(H∗)
−c1
[αf ′′(H∗)]2
[
f ′′(H∗) + αf ′′′(H∗)
∂H∗
∂α
]}
=− [f
′(H∗)]2
αf ′′(H∗)
{
f ′(H∗) + p
c1
α
[
2− f
′(H∗)f ′′′(H∗)
f ′′(H∗)2
]}
.
For this term to be positive it has to be the case that
f ′(H∗) + p
c1
α
(
2− f
′(H∗)f ′′′(H∗)
[f ′′(H∗)]2
)
> 0. (29)
We know from equation (28) that equation (29) holds for any interior solution, which implies
∂p
∂α > 0 as required.
